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Abstract
Customers who boycott an organization after some scandal may actually exacerbate
the fraud problem they would like to prevent. This conclusion is derived from a
game-theoretic model that introduces a third player into the standard inspection
game. Focusing on the example of doping in professional sports, we observe that
doping is prevalent in equilibrium because customers undermine an organizer’s
incentives to inspect the athletes. Establishing transparency about doping tests is
necessary but not sufficient to overcome this dilemma. Our analysis has practical
implications for the design of anti-doping policies as well as for other situations of
fraudulent activities.
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Introduction
When fraudulent activities are detected in some organization, the customers
have to make a decision. Either they continue the relationship with this organi-
zation or they boycott it. Behaving in the latter way, that is, reacting to scandals
1 Department of Economics, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany
2 Department of Sports Economics and Sociology, Saarland University, Saarbru¨cken, Germany
Corresponding Author:
Berno Buechel, Department of Economics, University of Hamburg, Von-Melle-Park 5, 20146 Hamburg,
Germany.
Email: berno.buechel@uni-hamburg.de; www.berno.info
Journal of Sports Economics
2016, Vol. 17(8) 767-789





with a withdrawal of support, can be expected to reduce the extent of fraudulent
activities (since the potential loss increases). As we will show in this article,
however, the effect might just go into the opposite direction: Critical customers
who withdraw support after a scandal unintendedly trigger fraudulent activities.
This conclusion follows from a game-theoretic model that extends the standard
inspection game by an additional player.1 We carefully analyze and discuss this
model focusing on the example of doping in professional sports.
Sport events, such as the Olympic Games, have grown to a size of substantial
economic importance. Thereby the use of performance-enhancing drugs
(doping) is considered as a risk for the sports industry. There are at least three
reasons why it is socially desirable to reduce the extent of doping (cf. Preston &
Szymanski, 2003). First, as it is well known, the use of performance-enhancing
drugs can lead to serious health problems for the athletes. Second, athletes often
serve as role models.2 Thus, a doped athlete is neither in the best interest of par-
ents nor would she give the right image for a sponsoring company. Closely
linked to that point is the third argument: An important character of sport is that
it becomes uninteresting if athletes systematically violate the rules.3 Given these
arguments, it is not surprising that even the United Nations and the European
Commission are interested in anti-doping policies.4 The most important scien-
tific questions on doping concern (i) the actual extent of doping—whether the
use of performance-enhancing drugs is an exceptional practice of some delin-
quent athletes or a common practice—and (ii) instruments to reduce the extent
of doping.
Despite the rich set of anecdotal evidence, empirical studies about doping
are rare. It seems very hard to collect data of high quality. Those few studies
that try to assess the extent of doping empirically make estimations that often
strongly exceed the public perception (Pitsch & Emrich, 2012; Pitsch, Emrich,
& Klein, 2007; Striegel, Ulrich, & Simon, 2010).5 Theoretical approaches to
the doping issue have acknowledged that decisions to dope are not independent
of decisions of other actors such as other athletes or control agencies. Game
theory provides tools to analyze such situations of strategic interaction. The
primary focus is thereby given to the interaction among athletes. Since the pio-
neer work of Breivik (1992), this interaction is often modeled as a prisoner’s
dilemma, where to dope is the dominant strategy (cf. Bird & Wagner, 1997;
Eber, 2008; Haugen, 2004).6 Extending this approach, game theory is also
used to analyze the interaction between athletes and an organization which
decides upon conducting doping tests. This is usually modeled as an inspection
game (Berentsen, Bruegger, & Loertscher, 2008; Kirstein, 2014).7 In an
inspection game, there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium because athletes
want to dope without being detected, while the control organization tries to
detect doping without testing clean athletes. Thus, mixed strategy equilibria,
(respectively, perfect Bayesian equilibria) are used, which predict an inter-
mediate level of doping.
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We build on the previous game-theoretic work on doping but take the anal-
ysis one level further by introducing customers as an additional player into the
game. Customers are highly important because they finally make professional
sports economically viable. Consider a sports event from which customers turn
away their interest. This event does not only suffer of less ticket and merchan-
dise revenues, it will also become less attractive for media companies that report
from the event and for companies that sponsor the event. In the Appendix, we
present several pieces of evidence for the importance of customers. In particular,
the recent history of the Tour de France, the world’s most famous cycling race,
suggests that the reaction to the disclosures of systematic doping practices is the
withdrawal of support from several stakeholders. For many other disciplines and
events, this scenario has not happened, but it seems to be always present as a
threat. Importantly, already the threat of withdrawing support is sufficient to
significantly affect the incentives to dope, as we show in this article. Despite
their essential role, previous studies (to the best of our knowledge) have not
included customers as a player in an inspection game. This article closes this
gap and explicitly analyzes the role of customers for the incentives to dope
(to cheat in a different context).
In our model, customers support a sports event as long as there is no doping scan-
dal. After a scandal, we assume that customers would withdraw their support (and
contrast this case from the benchmark case of noncritical customers who always
keep supporting). One might conjecture that the behavior of critical customers
induces incentives for organizers and athletes to avoid doping since this increases
the costs of doping for both athletes and organizers. However, our analysis reveals
that the opposite is true: Under mild assumptions, the unique outcome of the game is
that athletes dope, while organizers make insufficient effort to test them. Because
our assumptions are very parsimonious, this result is robust against many changes
in the specification of utility. The intuition is simply that customers who can with-
draw their support constitute a threat to the organizers such that they avoid uncover-
ing (the full extent of) doping.
We then investigate how to change the institutions in order to support a doping-
free equilibrium. It turns out that establishing transparency serves this purpose: If
customers can observe whether there were serious doping tests, even if they turned
out to be negative, then there is a doping-free equilibrium. However, this equili-
brium is not unique—there is still an equilibrium involving doping. To rule out all
doping equilibria, it would be necessary to have a different kind of customer beha-
vior, not only different institutions. We discuss the real-world predictions of this
model and the practical implications of its results for currently debated anti-
doping policies.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows: The second section presents
the model. The third section establishes the main results, thereby characterizing the
doping equilibrium. The fourth section studies a change of institutions that admits a
doping-free equilibrium. The fifth section concludes.
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Model
Considering benefits from professional sports, there is a large set of stake-
holders: sports associations, team sponsors, event organizers, event sponsors,
media, spectators, anti-doping agencies, doctors, politicians, and so on. In our
model, we restrict attention to three types of players: athletes, organizers, and
customers. Athletes can decide between doping and staying clean, whereas dop-
ing is defined as the use of illicit substances or methods.8
In our model, organizers represent those actors who decide whether to con-
duct serious doping tests or not. Thus, testing stands for systematically attempt-
ing to detect and punish doped athletes. An organizer in that sense is the World
Anti-Doping Agency (WADA).9 In several disciplines, the National Anti-
Doping Agencies (NADAs) have a major role in organizing doping tests of their
athletes. In other disciplines, the sports associations or the event organizers are
the key players in organizing systematic doping tests.10 Consequently, organi-
zers in our model represent anti-doping agencies, as well as organizers of sports
events and sports associations. Indeed, anti-doping agencies are not independent
of these organizations (Eber, 2002; Preston & Szymanski, 2003); and with
respect to the decision we study here, they have similar interests or they can
simply not conduct serious tests without the collaboration of the event organi-
zers or the sports associations.11
Customers can decide upon staying a supporter or to withdraw support, for exam-
ple, not to continue watching an event on TV, not to further buy merchandise prod-
ucts, or to quit a membership in a club of supporters. Besides spectators, we can also
subsume sponsors and the media (who broadcast or report about the sport events)
under the term customers. A withdrawal of each of these three actors can trigger the
withdrawal of the two others. Sport events cannot survive without sponsors, with-
drawal of the media restricts the access of the customers, and finally, sport is only
attractive for sponsors as long as there are customers. To make the arguments as
clear as possible, we focus on one representative customer and we also study only
one representative organizer and one representative athlete (such that the strategic
interaction between athletes is only presented in a highly reduced form). The
extension to multiple players of a type would not qualitatively affect the results,
but it would affect the ease of illustration. Therefore, we interpret the behavior
of a representative player as the behavior of the athletes, the organizers, and the
customers (in plural).
The timing of the players’ actions is as illustrated in Figure 1. First, athletes
decide on doping; then organizers decide on testing; and finally, customers
decide upon staying. The information set of the organizers indicates that they
do not observe the action of athletes. Thus, the moves of athletes and organizers
can also be considered as being simultaneous. In our model, testing means that a
doped athlete is detected and punished. If the history in this first stage is (Dope,
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Test) we call it a ‘‘scandal.’’ All other histories, that is, (Dope, Notest), (Clean,
Test), and (Clean, Notest), are no scandal. Since doping tests and their outcomes
are not transparent to the public, customers cannot distinguish between the three
possible histories if there was no scandal.12 This is captured by the information
set consisting of three nodes. As Figure 1 shows, this game has eight potential
outcomes, which we label in the following way: d-t-s, d-t-l, d-n-s, d-n-l, c-t-s,
c-t-l, c-n-s, and c-n-l as also illustrated in Figure 1. The depicted payoff vectors
are in the order athletes, organizers, customers and only present one possible
example.13
While athletes and organizers have two strategies each fDope, Cleang, respec-
tively fTest, Notestg, customers can choose between two actions in two information
sets, which yields four strategies. We denote them by fSS, SL, LS, LLg, where, for
instance, LS stands for action Leave in the first information set (after a scandal) and
action Stay in the second information set (after no scandal). The wording ‘‘leave’’
is a bit strong in the sense that it is not necessary that customer support is fully lost
with this action, but only that it becomes significantly smaller compared with the
action Stay.
The Doping Equilibrium
In our analysis, we focus on pure strategies and employ the notion of subgame per-
fect Nash equilibrium (SPNE). When the extension to behavioral strategies, where
Dope
Test Notest Test Notest

































Figure 1. Structure of the game and an example for payoffs.
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agents can continuously mix between actions, and the refinement of perfect Baye-
sian equilibrium yield different results, we make this explicit. We will introduce
assumptions on the players’ preferences step by step to clarify that mild assumptions
are sufficient for some results (equilibrium), while stronger assumptions are needed
for others (inefficiency).
Existence of a Doping Equilibrium
We are most interested in the kind of customers who withdraw their support after a
scandal but not otherwise. This idea is covered by Assumption 1 which makes mild
assumptions on the preferences of all the players.
Assumption 1: For the players’ preferences, we assume the following:
Ath: d-n-s Ath c-n-s, that is, athletes prefer to dope if not tested; and c-t-s Ath
d-t-l, that is, athletes prefer to be clean and tested, while customers stay, over
being doped and tested, while customers leave.
Org: d-n-s Org d-t-l, that is, a scandal combined with the loss of customers is
worse for the organizers than undetected doping where customers stay; and
c-t-s Org c-n-l, that is, testing clean athletes with customers support is better
for the organizers than not testing clean athletes when customers leave.
Cus: d-t-l Cus d-t-s, that is, customers prefer to withdraw support after a scandal;
and d-n-s Cus d-n-l, c-t-s Cus c-t-l, and c-n-s Cus c-n-l, that is, customers
prefer to stay if there is no scandal.
Assumption 1 is easy to justify. The assumption that athletes dope if there are no
tests follows from the standard assumption in the literature that the benefits of dop-
ing exceed the costs, even if there were tests (e.g., Maennig, 2002).14 Organizers
might existentially depend on customers’ support such that they would probably pre-
fer any outcome where customers stay (i.e., d-t-s, d-n-s, c-t-s, and c-n-s) over any
outcome where support is withdrawn (i.e., d-t-l, d-n-l, c-t-l, and c-n-l). This also
means that testing is not too expensive in the sense that the withdrawal of customer
support is worse than conducting tests. (This assumption need not be satisfied for
sport events that do not belong to professional sports). The preference of the custom-
ers to leave after a scandal means that they are bothered by doping scandals, rather
than enjoying them.15 Finally, customers’ preferences to stay if there was no scandal
reflect the general interest in sports based on the view that customers are unable to
distinguish between undetected doping and clean sport even ex post. That is, their
payoff of staying a supporter does not depend on whether d-n-s, c-t-s, or c-n-s is
reached because they cannot distinguish between them.16 And similarly, their payoff
of withdrawing their support would not depend on whether outcome d-n-l, c-t-l, or c-
n-l is reached.17 Given Assumption 1, a customer will stay a supporter if and only if
there was no scandal—the behavior under scrutiny. The following proposition shows
that then outcome d-n-s—that is, athletes dope, organizers do not test, and customers
stay supporters—is an equilibrium outcome.
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Proposition 1 (doping equilibrium): Under Assumptions 1 s*:¼ (Dope, Notest,
LS) is a SPNE.
The proofs of this and all other propositions are collected in Online Appendix B.
The intuition for Proposition 1 becomes apparent when considering the strategic
interaction between athletes and organizers, given the customers’ behavior. Using
the example payoffs from Figure 1, the following Matrix 1 is induced by customers
who stay if and only if there is no scandal. This can be contrasted with Matrix 2 that













In the benchmark case, best response dynamics always follow a cycle, as it can be
seen from Matrix 2. This is the classic observation in the inspection game that there
is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. In mixed strategies, there would be an equili-
brium where the probability of doping for our example payoffs is one over four. The
strategic interaction in our model only differs from the benchmark case concerning
the payoff in the upper left matrix entry, which is due to customers who leave after a
scandal. As it can be seen from Matrix 1, this breaks the cycle of deviations (in the
best response dynamics) and yields the equilibrium in pure strategies established by
Proposition 1. In words, customers who leave after a scandal establish a threat to the
organizers such that they prefer not to detect doped athletes, even if they had done so
in case that the customers were uncritical (i.e., in the benchmark case where the cus-
tomers always stayed). Thus, the explanation for our qualitatively new result is that
the introduction of (critical) customers undermines the organizers’ incentives to
uncover (the full extent of) doping because organizers anticipate that they would suf-
fer losses in the case of scandals. As a consequence, athletes are not seriously tested
and therefore decide to dope.18
Next, we discuss the robustness (and the practical implications) of the finding.
Robustness of the Doping Equilibrium
Proposition 1 only serves as a clear empirical prediction if there are no other equili-
bria and if its statement is robust to specification details. We first address uniqueness
of the doping equilibrium and then study its robustness with respect to a continuous
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(instead of binary) action space, an imperfect test technology, and a different type of
customer.
Uniqueness. Concerning uniqueness, we show that assumptions that are standardly
made in inspection games are sufficient to exclude other equilibria.19 These assump-
tions are collected in Assumption 2.20
Assumption 2 (inspection): In the inspection game, the following assumptions
are made on the preferences of athletes and organizers:
Ath: c-t-s Ath d-t-s and c-t-l Ath d-t-l, that is, athletes prefer not to dope if there
are tests; and d-n-s Ath c-n-s and d-n-l Ath c-n-l, that is, athletes prefer to
dope if there are no tests.
Org d-t-s Org d-n-s and d-t-l Org d-n-l, that is, organizers prefer to test the ath-
letes if those are doped; and c-n-s Org c-t-s and c-n-l Org c-t-l, that is, orga-
nizers prefer not to test if athletes are clean.
Assumption 2 is partially redundant with Assumption 1, but further specifies that
athletes prefer not to dope if tested and that organizers prefer to test if and only if
athletes are doped. This reflects that organizers are willing to detect doping, while
testing is costly. The example payoffs provided in Figure 1 satisfy both Assumptions
1 and 2.
Proposition 2 shows that the mild Assumption 1 and the standard Assumption 2
are powerful enough to rule out any equilibrium besides the previously found doping
equilibrium.
Proposition 2 (uniqueness): Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then s* ¼
(Dope, Notest, LS) is the unique SPNE.
Next, we address robustness of this result against three natural variations of the
model.
Continuous actions. In reality, customers might decide on the extent to which they still
support, which is a richer action space than just the binary choice of Stay or Leave. In
order to relax the assumptions of binary actions for each player, we consider beha-
vioral strategies. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, however, this does not affect the
result. In equilibrium, athletes dope with probability 1, organizers test with probabil-
ity 0, and customers certainly leave after a scandal and stay in the absence of a
scandal.
If customers preferred to partially reduce their support after a scandal, the ques-
tion is whether the reduction is negligible such that we are in the benchmark case or
whether the reduction is significant such as in our model where organizers try to
avoid scandals (cf. Assumption 1: d-n-s Org d-t-l). In the former case, we would
have an equilibrium in which players randomize, in the latter case, the doping result
holds.
774 Journal of Sports Economics 17(8)
Imperfect test technology. Unrealistically, we have assumed that the test technology is
free of errors. Extending our game to allow for false–positive and false–negative
tests that occur with some probability e leads to a more realistic model, but not to
a different result. As it can be shown using the example payoffs, the unique SPNE
is that athletes dope, organizers do not test, and customers stay in the absence of a
scandal as long as e < 1
2
.21
Sophisticated customers. A crucial assumption throughout our analysis is that cus-
tomers are unable to distinguish between undetected doping and clean sport
even ex post such that they prefer outcome d-n-s over d-n-l. Our motivation
is not the literal (game-theoretic) interpretation that customers infer that there
must be a high level of doping but do not care as long as there is no scandal
(even if this might be true for some media companies or sponsors who we also
consider in the role of customers). Rather, we consider less sophisticated cus-
tomers who do not draw these inferences and therefore stay supporters in the
absence of positive doping tests, which is arguably much more realistic than
customers who leave in that case. For example, most football fans do not seem
to be trying to infer the underlying level of doping and to turn away their inter-
est from competitions where it can be suspected that there are insufficient dop-
ing controls. However, it is a game-theoretically natural and economically
interesting exercise to consider the effects of sophisticated customers who make
the inferences by analyzing the situation of strategic interaction and react to
their belief about doping.22 Let us briefly elaborate on this alternative (hypothe-
tical) model, which is obtained when reducing the payoff of customers for out-
come d-n-s sufficiently to let d-n-l be preferred. As detailed in Online Appendix
C.1, there are no pure strategy SPNE in that model. Customers still leave after a
scandal, but all other equilibrium choices are mixed actions. The equilibrium
belief of customers is that if there is no scandal, then the probability of doping
is exactly 50%, such that customers are indifferent between staying and leaving.
The probability of doping in equilibrium is p*  59%. This is smaller than in
our model with naive agents, in which the pure strategy equilibrium predicts that
all athletes (who are calculating dopers) dope. However, compared with the
benchmark case, where customers stay unconditionally (which we also refer
to as the inspection game), sophisticated customers lead to an increase in the
probability of doping from 25% to 59%. Thus, the qualitative result, that the
introduction of customers to the inspection game increases the level of doping,
holds for both naive and sophisticated customers. The computed fractions of
dopers, of course, depend on the absolute payoffs of the example and suggest
that they have some cardinal interpretation.
In sum, it is a robust finding that the presence of customers who might withdraw
their support accentuates the extent of doping. Let us now briefly discuss the inter-
pretation and implications of this result.
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Discussion of the Doping Equilibrium
The real-world prediction of our simple model is that the number of dopers is large,
while the probability of a doped athlete to be caught and punished is close to zero.
The real extent of doping within professional sports is hard to assess and thus
remains highly controversial. Theoretically, there are strong incentives to use
performance-enhancing drugs. In particular, if our second prediction holds—that the
probability of being detected and punished is small.23 The explanation that our
model provides for doping is that organizers do not want to uncover the full extent
of doping because they anticipate that they would suffer losses in the case of
scandals.
Our argument that organizers lack the incentives for serious doping tests is in
line with Eber (2002) who argues that organizers have a low effort bias, which
becomes stronger the more the authorities weight the economic stakes of profes-
sional sport.24 Within his model, athletes form rational expectations about the
effort of authorities to prevent doping, which leads to a credibility problem of the
organizers (Eber, 2002).25
The prediction that organizers do not seriously test is also empirically difficult to
assess. However, there are several pieces of evidence that support this view. For
example, consider the anti-doping instrument called world anti-doping code
(WADC). This is an international regulatory system that specifies test procedures,
and lists of forbidden substances, and accredits doping labs. (The WADC is an
instrument of the WADA and we assume for the moment that the WADA is free
of incentives issues in the fight of doping.) Implementing the WADC in some dis-
cipline would contribute to establishing a strict anti-doping regime. As it turns out,
however, the problem of the WADC is the lack of compliance on the part of the
international sports associations (Emrich & Pierdzioch, 2013). For example, the fol-
lowing prominent sports associations are reported to refuse the WADC: the Interna-
tional Football Association (FIFA), the International Tennis Federation, and the
International Cycling Association (UCI; Emrich & Pierdzioch, 2013).26 Another
indication that there need not be serious doping tests although many efforts in the
fight against doping are claimed is the charter formulated by a movement called
‘‘change cycling now.’’ The movement consists of sports journalists, former cycling
officials, and of former cyclists, including a Tour de France winner. The charter
strongly requests that the organization responsible for doping tests becomes inde-
pendent and thus indirectly accuses the current institution as not being so. The char-
ter expresses this as a principle to create doping-free cycling in the future: ‘‘The
responsibility for deciding who is tested, when they are tested, and what drugs they
are tested for, must reside in an independent entity that is beyond the control of the
UCI.’’27 Thus, even in cycling, where there is a long list of detected dopers, it seems
that the probability of being detected when doped is not that high. We argue that in
any discipline, there are incentives to put insufficient effort into the detection of
dopers. Let us now return to our model and discuss efficiency.
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Pareto Efficiency
Proposition 2 shows that the unique equilibrium outcome is d-n-s, which means that
doping is prevalent. Whether this is a socially desirable outcome is not fully uncon-
troversial.28 Let us discuss the assumptions that decide upon efficiency. In our
model, the following assumption assures that d-n-s is indeed inefficient in the strong
sense of being Pareto dominated.
Assumption 3: For the preferences of the three players, we assume the following:
Ath: c-t-s Ath d-n-s Ath d-t-s, that is, athletes prefer being tested and clean over
being not tested when doped over being tested and doped.
Org: c-t-s Org d-n-s, that is, organizers prefer the testing of clean athletes over
not testing doped Athletes.
Cus: c-t-s Cus d-n-s, that is, customers weakly prefer tested clean athletes over
not tested doped athletes.
Note that Assumptions 1–3 are mutually consistent, for example, payoffs of Figure 1
satisfy all three assumptions. Assumption 3 is plausible, but arguably much more
controversial than Assumptions 1 and 2. Athletes might dislike doping tests even
if they are clean, because they have to be constantly available. However, we assume
that athletes are better off by being tested and clean than being doped, for example,
because doping would seriously affect their health. Organizers might have high costs
of conducting doping tests and they might benefit from the performance of doped
athletes such that we had d-n-s Org c-t-s. However, we take the view of benevolent
organizers who prefer to detect doped athletes (as long as customers stay) such that
the relation is just the opposite. Finally, for customers, we keep the view that
they cannot distinguish between the outcomes that do not include a scandal. Thus,
d-n-s Cus c-t-s Cus c-n-s.
Clearly, under Assumption 3, outcome d-n-s is Pareto dominated by outcome
c-t-s. Thus, the unique equilibrium outcome in our model is not Pareto efficient.
Outcome c-t-s, however, is not Pareto dominated by any other outcome as estab-
lished by Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 (Pareto efficiency): Suppose Assumptions 1 and 3 hold. Then out-
come d-n-s is not Pareto efficient, while outcome c-t-s is.
In this subsection, we have shown that we are indeed in a social dilemma situa-
tion. The unique equilibrium outcome, which involves doping, is Pareto dominated
by a doping-free outcome. The next question is how the institutions can be changed
such that the Pareto efficient outcome c-t-s becomes an equilibrium outcome. If the
controversial Assumption 3 is not accepted, then the doping equilibrium need not be
Pareto dominated. Still, however, it is of high interest to find conditions for a doping-
free equilibrium.
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Inducing a Doping-Free Equilibrium
We first establish the results and then discuss current policy suggestions in the light
of the model.
Change of Customers’ Information Structure
In order to induce an outcome without doping, we change the information structure
in the game. In particular, we let the customers also be informed about doping tests
that turned out to be negative. Consider the extensive game tree illustrated in
Figure 2. As before, organizers decide on testing the athletes without observing
whether there was doping or not. The customers then decide upon staying a sup-
porter or leaving. The information they have for this decision now consists of
three information sets: one is after a scandal (Dope, Notest), one after a negative
test (Clean, Test), and one after no test, which consists of the two histories
(Dope, Notest) and (Clean, Notest). This yields eight strategies for the custom-
ers, which we denote by fSSS, SSL, SLS, SLL, LSS, LSL, LLS, LLLg, such that
the first letter stands for the action after a scandal, the second letter for the
action after a negative test, and the third letter for the action if there were no
tests. (The example payoffs in Figure 2 are as in Figure 1.)
In the game with less transparency (studied in the former section), under Assump-
tions 1 and 2, the unique equilibrium outcome involved doping. The following pro-
position shows that with more transparency, there is a doping-free equilibrium, as
well.
Dope
Test Notest Test Notest


































Figure 2. Structure of the game with well-informed customers and an example for payoffs.
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Proposition 4 (doping-free equilibrium): Under Assumptions 1 and 2, there are
two SPNE in the game with finer information structure: s^:¼ (Clean, Test, LSL)
and s:¼ (Dope, Notest, LSS).
Proposition 4 shows that a change in the information structure in our model is suf-
ficient to obtain a doping-free equilibrium. Thus, the social dilemma can be over-
come by establishing transparency. The intuition for this result can be gained
from the interaction of athletes and organizers, given customers who play LSL. This
is represented in Matrix 3 using the example payoffs. Organizers do test, given that







Considering behavioral strategies, there is a continuum of equilibria in which ath-
letes are clean, organizers test, and customers stay after no tests with probability
r  3
4
for the example payoffs. Thus, there are doping-free equilibria although the
probability that customers leave in the absence of doping tests might be low.
However, the doping-free equilibria come with (at least) two caveats. First, they
involve suboptimal behavior outside the equilibrium path. Indeed, after no test, the
equilibrium strategy of the customers implies to leave (with positive probability),
although this is not in line with Assumption 1.29 Second, there is still another equi-
librium that involves doping.
The two issues would be solved at once, if customers had different preferences.
Suppose, hypothetically, that customers were more skeptical about doping practices
and therefore insisted on the proof of clean sports in order to stay supporters. With
such customers, the doping-free equilibrium sˆ was unique.30 Moreover, there would
be no more issue of suboptimal behavior outside the equilibrium path because the
customers’ threat to leave after no tests would then be credible.
It thus not only takes a better information level for the customers but also a
change in preferences, that is, they would have to insist on doping tests in order
to unambiguously induce incentives for a doping-free sport.
Implications for Anti-Doping Policies
In the literature on doping incentives, various approaches are suggested to solve the
doping issue. Many of them concern the change of incentives on part of the athletes.
On one hand, it is suggested to change the punishments or to increase the fines for
being doped (e.g., Haugen, 2004). In the light of our model, however, this approach
is not effective since in equilibrium athletes are not tested and thus do not get pun-
ished. On the other hand, the suggestion is to decrease the benefits of doping, for
example, by reducing the prize spread between different ranks or by reducing the
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number of competitions (Eber & The´pot, 1999). But also decreasing the benefits of
doping only affects the behavior of athletes if it succeeds in making doping less
attractive than not doping (i.e., the payoff of doping must be reduced to such an
extent that the ordinal preference that we assume in the model switches direction).
This seems to be at least questionable.
Thus, for athletes, who are calculating dopers, any anti-doping instrument has to
make sure that the probability that doping is punished is sufficiently high. In this arti-
cle, we have identified the lack of the organizers’ incentives to really implement
such a regime. A rather radical solution to these misguided incentives is to replace
the actors who are responsible for doping tests. Indeed, it is currently debated in sev-
eral countries (among them Germany) whether to establish a legislation that makes
the state and its body responsible for the prosecution of dopers.31 In some countries,
for example, Belgium, this is already implemented. In principle, the proposed shift
of responsibility is a solution to the lack of control since the police and the courts do
not have the conflict of interest that NADAs and sports associations have. However,
this approach is only fruitful if it is practically possible to fully circumvent the orga-
nizers, that is, if the collaboration of sports associations and NADAs is not crucial
for the prosecution of doped athletes.
In the fourth section, we have elaborated on a different approach to fight doping.
We show how customers can contribute to doping-free sports if they are sufficiently
well informed. In particular, we require information about doping tests which admits
customers to condition their support for the sports event on the presence of doping
tests (as illustrated in Figure 2). Whether or not customers really insist on doping
tests, then determines the extent of doping in equilibrium (Proposition 4). Thus, a
direct implication of our model is that transparency about the doping tests and their
outcomes should be established.
This requirement is not satisfied in professional sports today. Most of the data that
are publicly available only contain cases of detected doping but not information
about the extent of testing. For example, the Internet Anti-Doping Database created
by Norwegian sports journalist Trond Husø contains more than 5,000 cases, but
mostly of detected dopers. In the absence of doping scandals, this does not allow cus-
tomers to discriminate between clean sports and undetected doping (such as illu-
strated in Figure 1).
One type of actors who is in principle capable of establishing transparency are
sports associations that we study as organizers in our model. However, as argued
previously, such organizations lack incentives to do so. Dilger and Tolsdorf
(2004) and Striegel, Ulrich, and Simon (2010) assume that their lack of compliance
is one reason why data on doping are so limited. In order to achieve more transpar-
ency, the WADA could open the access to their database called ADAMS. ADAMS
was introduced to simplify the organization and realization of doping tests.32 Cur-
rently, only certain actors of the immediate sports environment are allowed to use
ADAMS. Opening the access to ADAMS seems to be a cheap way to establish trans-
parency, while such a policy might involve several new issues, including the
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violation of privacy rights. Moreover, it can be difficult or costly to understand and
interpret the data for customers. A much simpler suggestion is that the WADA
makes public to which extent sports associations and NADAs comply with anti-
doping standards. This could be a simple rating that gives customers a clear signal
about which disciplines and events are credible in their fight against doping. Of
course, this requires independence on part of the WADA, which is also doubted
(cf. Eber, 2002; Preston & Szymanski, 2003), but, in principle, we conclude that
there should be an independent rating or certifying agency that officially measures
to which extent certain sports events have implemented an anti-doping regime.
Whether or not doping prevails in the future is then dependent on the customers’
preferences.
Concluding Remarks
In this article, we have extended the inspection game (cf. Avenhaus, Von Stengel, &
Zamir, 2002) by a third player: customers, who can withdraw their support. As it is
shown in the application of doping in professional sports, the behavior of critical
customers accentuates the fraudulent behavior.33 Customers who are ready to leave
after a doping scandal undermine the organizers’ incentives to test athletes on
performance-enhancing drugs and to convict them on doping. As a consequence,
athletes have stronger incentives to dope although this need not be in the best interest
of any of the three types of players. Our analysis substantially strengthens the argu-
ment already outlined by Eber (2002) who comes to the following conclusion: The
authority responsible for doping controls ‘‘may have some temptations to slacken its
antidoping effort when confronted with doping affairs to preserve the economic
value of the shows (e.g., the Olympic Games organized by the IOC [International
Olympic Committee]). Knowing that, athletes may rationally not believe in strong
antidoping policies and may then continue to choose high levels of doping.’’ Our
analysis of incentives suggests that the few spectacular cases of convicted dopers are
not delinquent exceptions, but rather unlucky cheaters or scapegoats, because the
probability of being detected when doped is low (cf. Preston & Szymanski, 2003).
To elaborate on potential solutions for the doping dilemma, we show that a change
in the information structure in our model serves to obtain a doping-free equilibrium
(Proposition 4). The crucial change is to establish transparency in the sense that
customers know whether there were negative tests or there were no serious tests
(cf. Figure 2 vs. Figure 1). This allows customers and other stakeholders to condi-
tion their support on the presence of serious anti-doping tests. Practically, the
required transparency could be established by a certificate or rating that shows
which sports events have established a strict anti-doping regime.
However, our model is not restricted to doping and professional sports. In many
different industries, for example, textile or food, customers do not know very well
the production process of the goods that they buy. In particular, it is hidden whether
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the producing companies complied with all standards and ethical norms—except if
there is a scandal in the news. Scandals make public, for example, the use of child
labor in the production of clothes, as well as the violation of hygienic standards in
the food industry. After the detection of such fraudulent activities in some organiza-
tion, there is a loss of reputation and critical customers may react with a boycott.
There are not few contexts, where the agent who is able to detect the potential frau-
dulent activities is also affected by such a scandal. Consider a company in the role of
the organizer, who has business relations with another firm (athlete) that does poten-
tially not comply with certain ethical standards. Detecting norm violations would
also undermine the reputation of the company itself. Customers who react with a
boycott substantially increase the loss of the company and thereby undermine its
incentives to uncover (potential) scandals.34 When there is no other agent who is
capable of detecting the fraud without the help of the company, the number of frau-
dulent activities might even increase. As our model shows, this outcome can be
altered if customers are informed about control activities of all companies by some
independent institution. Thus, transparency is necessary in order to overcome this
type of social dilemma.
Appendix
Some Evidence on the Importance of Customers
Customers of a sports event do not only expect high performances from the athletes
but also their compliance to the rules. During the Olympic Games in Barcelona
1992, for example, 91% of 475 interviewed spectators answered that they want to
see high performances at the Olympic Games, but a majority of them (58%) consid-
ered doping as a threat to the Games (Messing and Mu¨ller, 1996). For the Olympic
Games of Sydney 2000 and Athens 2004, the number of people who agree that dop-
ing is a threat has even increased to 69% and 82% (Messing, Mueller, & Schormann,
2008) and doping is considered as the most severe threat for Olympic Games, rank-
ing above terrorism and corruption (Messing, Mu¨ller, & Schorman, 2004). This view
is not restricted to spectators, but it is also predominantly shared by athletes, students
of sports science, and media representatives (Tro¨ger, 2006). But what is the actual
‘‘threat’’ that starts out from doping in sports? Probably such a scenario can be best
studied in an event for which it is known that doping is widespread—such as the
world’s most famous cycling tour, the Tour de France.
The recent exposure of the doping affair concerning the 7-times Tour de France
winner (Lance Armstrong) is just one very spectacular case in a long list of disclo-
sures. In 1998, a whole cycling team (Festina) was excluded from the Tour de France
after a large amount of performance-enhancing drugs was found in a team car. In the
2006 Tour de France, an affair centered on a physician (Eufemiano Fuentes) led to
the expulsion of several participants and some days after the Tour de France 2006, it
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was detected that the winner (Floyd Landis) was positively tested on performance-
enhancing drugs. The fact that, in this case, as well as in many other prominent cases,
doping delicti became public after the Tour de France, implies that the customers’
reaction to the scandal cannot be simply measured by a change of the audience rat-
ings during one Tour (Van Reeth, 2013). One year after the Fuentes affair, the Ger-
man public sector TV channel quit the live broadcast of that actual Tour de France
when a German cyclist (Patrik Sinkewitz) was convicted on doping. Although this
TV channel reported from the Tour de France again in the years 2008 until 2011,
they finally quit in 2012. The reason for that was a sharp decline in the audience rat-
ings from one year to the next. (While the market share amounted to 13% in year
2008, there was a decline to approximately 9% in 2009.) Not only TV channels, also
sponsors reacted with exit. For example, the cycling team sponsor Phonak quit, after
their team leader (Floyd Landis) was convicted of doping, and a German cycling
team sponsor (Gerolsteiner) quit after two German cyclists (Stefan Schumacher and
Bernhard Kohl) were found guilty. A majority of fans supports such reactions of
sponsors and TV broadcasters (Solberg, Hanstad, & Thoring, 2010). In sum, the
recent history of cycling demonstrates that the reaction to the disclosures of systema-
tic doping practices is the withdrawal of support from several stakeholders. This is
true for media companies, sponsors, and—last but not least—customers (spectators).
It is a notable fact that there are customers who still support the Tour de France
despite (or maybe even because of) the doping scandals. However, it seems undeni-
able that the organizers of the event have suffered substantial losses due to the with-
drawal of support of many customers, sponsors, and media companies.
Similar scenarios of withdrawal of support have not happened in most of the other
disciplines. As the Olympic Games in London show, the interest in sports and, partic-
ularly, in track, and field athletics is huge. This does not mean that track and field ath-
letics is free of doping. For example, the U.S. sprinter Justin Gatlin who sprinted to his
personal best in London has a background on doping delicti. Further, the two nearest
rivals (Tyson Gay and Asafa Powell) of the star in track and field athletics, Usain Bolt,
were convicted on doping in 2013. These cases are not that exceptional: Among 64
world class sprinters on the 100 meters track, Dilger and Tolsdorf (2004) found that
16, that is, 25%, have been convicted on doping somewhere in the period from
1997 until 2002. Also, the U.S. sports leagues for American Football and Baseball
(National Football League andMajor League Baseball) have to deal with some doping
scandals. For example, baseball star Alex Rodriguez was suspended for 211 matches
until the end of season 2014 because of the suspicion that he consumed banned drugs.
It seems that, despite such cases, the public perception in many disciplines is that
most of the athletes do not use performance-enhancing substances. For example, in
the year 1988, the most prominent 100 meters track star Ben Johnson was convicted
on doping, while during the next Olympic Games (in Barcelona 1992) only every
fourth or fifth spectator (22%) agreed that doping and manipulation are determining
factors of the Olympic performances (Messing & Mu¨ller, 1996). In professional
Tennis or Soccer, doping is rarely a topic at all.
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Concerning the Tour de France, in contrast, most of the TV spectators (89%) in a
survey assumed that doping is a common practice. (These figures are reported by a
German newspaper and can be found at http://www.zeit.de/online/2007/28/tour-de-
france-medienkritik, last accessed: July 30, 2014.)
If the public perception of clean sport is critical for customers and other stake-
holders to keep their support, then organizers have strong incentives to avoid a list
of scandals comparable to the one of the Tour de France. Hence, the critical role of
customers lies in their potential to withdraw support. This is exactly the aspect of
customers that is incorporated in our model.
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Notes
1. Inspection games are discussed by Dresher (1962), Maschler (1967), Tsebelis (1989), and
Avenhaus, Von Stengel, and Zamir (2002), among others.
2. Results of an online survey reveal that spectators require that athletes serve as role models
for a clean and doping-free sport (Emrich, Pierdzioch, & Pitsch, 2014).
3. As a survey on the Olympic Games shows, spectators, fans, and so on, want to see records
and high performances but only under compliance of the rules (Messing &Mu¨ller, 1996).
4. The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization has established a
sizable fund dedicated to ‘‘the Elimination of Doping in Sport’’ (cf. http://www.unesco.
org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/anti-doping/fund-for-the-elimination-of-
doping-in-sport/projects/, last accessed: July 1, 2014). The European Commission and its
member states are currently developing an anti-doping law based on the view that doping
is ‘‘seriously undermining the principles of open and fair competition’’ (cf http://ec.
europa.eu/sport/policy/societal_role/doping_en.htm, last access: July 2014).
5. For example, Striegel et al. (2010) found an 8 times higher number of drug abuse than it is
officially confirmed.
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6. Interaction among heterogeneous athletes is analyzed by Berentsen (2002), Berentsen and
Lengwiler (2004), and Kra¨kel (2007).
7. The fact that in the inspection game there is only one athlete does not mean that the ideas
from the strategic interaction between athletes are neglected. In particular, it is assumed
that under no controls, athletes prefer to dope, which is based on considerations of com-
petition among athletes.
8. The definition of doping is itself an issue that is worth a discourse (cf. Eber, 2006). The
binary decision to dope or not to dope is a simplification of a set of decisions that might
also be considered as gradual. The simplification can be justified by at least two reasons.
First, it is often unambiguous whether an athlete uses illicit substances or not. Second, there
is a subjective interpretation of whether the athlete considers that he or she cheats or not.
9. The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) is an international institution founded in 1999
in Lausanne. Its main task is the worldwide coordination of anti-doping activities such as
detection, deterrence, and prevention. Moreover, the WADA coordinates doping tests
with National Anti-Doping Agencies.
10. For a richer description of the institutional setting, see Emrich and Pierdzioch (2013).
11. Eber (2002) suspects that even the WADA is not independent: ‘‘The problem is that
WADA [ . . . ] is a product of the IOC [International Olympic Committee] and is prob-
ably far from being independent of it.’’
12. The fact that sometimes sport events publicly announce the number of tests they have car-
ried through does not contradict this assumption. Still, customers do not know whether
the athletes have been seriously and systematically tested.
13. The specification of explicit payoffs or utility levels forces us to make many assumptions
that are not at all necessary for the derivations of the model implications. The set of
assumptions we will really use leaves room for many preference orderings and only one
of them is represented by the example payoffs in Figure 1. The advantage of such a par-
simonious approach is that eventually derived results are robust against changes of spe-
cification details.
14. This interaction between several athletes is often modeled as a prisoner’s dilemma. There
the dominant strategy is to dope, as we assume this behavior here for the case of no tests
and one representative athlete. In reality, there are also athletes who are unconditional
nondopers (Pitsch, Frenger, & Emrich, 2010). Their (trivial) behavior is not studied
within our model.
15. In reality, there might be customers who enjoy (doping) scandals. We will consider such
customers and, equivalently, uncritical customers, who always stay supporters, as a
benchmark later on. However, we study a more critical kind of customers here.
16. Basically, this assumption also means that customers do not respond to what they infer
about the behavior of other players. Alternatively, we could assume that customers also
withdraw their support in absence of positive doping tests, if they infer the use of doping
by analyzing the situation of strategic interaction. This alternative assumption and its
implications are discussed in the ‘‘Robustness of the Doping Equilibrium’’ subsection.
17. A similar interpretation holds if we consider sponsors and media companies in the role of
the customers. Moreover, there is a second interpretation of this assumption for these
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actors. It might be that they are able to distinguish ex post between different outcomes but
do not strongly care about doping as long as it is not officially detected.
18. This result is not due to other explanatory factors since under our assumptions testing can
be almost costless, the benefits of doping need not be high, and the disutility of being
detected can be huge. Importantly, our argument is not that doped athletes produce higher
performances which creates utility for the customers or organizers, although this idea
would not alter the result.
19. In an inspection game, an inspectee has to decide whether to comply or deviate
from a norm, while an inspector can choose between inspecting or not inspecting
the action. To embed this standard game into our notation, we would consider the
athlete as the inspectee, the organizer as the inspector, and for the customers which
are standardly excluded, we would assume constant behavior. That is, our model
differs from the standard inspection game only in that customers sometimes with-
draw support, while standardly customers always stay supporter or, alternatively,
they never support.
20. Usually, the inspection game is represented by numerical payoffs. This implies additional
assumptions to the ones collected here. However, those additional assumptions are nei-
ther consensual in the literature, nor are they necessary for our results (as long as we
obtain pure strategy equilibria).
21. The proof of this claim can be requested by the authors. The issue of imperfect test tech-
nology in doping tests is investigated by Kirstein (2014). He studies a game, in which the
enforcing agency receives an informative but imperfect signal about whether an athlete is
doped or not.
22. We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
23. In the absence of serious controls, athletes are in the classic (prisoner’s) dilemma because
they either can get a competitive advantage by doping or they have to assume that their
rivals are doped (cf. Breivik, 1992).
24. Of course, there are also other reasons, why detected doping leads to losses. For example,
a national sports association might have an interest that athletes from its country are suc-
cessful in international competition.
25. Concerning customers’ perceptions, one way to increase the public credibility of anti-
doping activities might be to detect doping cases but very few of them. Indeed, we have
not included the idea that the conviction of a few athletes enhances the credibility of clean
sport. We have focused on the main effect, which is that the conviction of many athletes
undermines the credibility of a sports event or even of a whole discipline. Importantly, we
are not arguing that organizers are unwilling to fight against doping, but simply that they
have strong incentives not to fully uncover doping activities.
26. The WADA does not have effective instruments to punish organizations that do not
comply.
27. The full charter can be found at http://www.changecyclingnow.org/wp-content/uploads/
2012/12/Charter-of-the-Willing.pdf (last access: July 30, 2014).
28. Savulescu, Foddy, and Clayton (2004) discuss several arguments concerning the useful-
ness of anti-doping rules and conclude that performance-enhancing drugs should be
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legalized. Concerning fairness, they find that legalization is in line with the ‘‘spirit of
sport’’ because it is still the aim to find the best athlete among all competitors.
29. Subgame perfection simply does not rule out this incredible threat. The notion of perfect
Bayesian equilibrium would do so and only render s** as an equilibrium.
30. This observation is formally shown in Online Appendix C.2.
31. The discussion caught new fire with the recent case of Lance Armstrong.
32. ADAMS has four main tasks: First, athletes are required to enter their actual wherabouts
and other users will be informed about actual infringements against reporting standards
(athlete’s wherabouts). Second, it is also possible to manage medical exceptional permis-
sions (Therapeutic Use Exemptions Management). Third, ADAMS informs about doping
tests, infringements, and sentences (Information Clearing House). Finally, ADAMS is
supposed to ease the scheduling of doping tests and the preparation of doping profiles
(Doping Control Platform).
33. Other counterintuitive results of the inspection game are already known (Andreozzi,
2004; Friehe, 2008; Holler, 1993). They concern the indifference of the mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium, which implies that a change of payoffs for one player does not affect
the equilibrium behavior of this player, but only its opponent’s. Maximin strategies are
used to address this issue (cf. Aumann & Maschler, 1972; Holler, 1990).
34. There is empirical evidence on a similar issue in the context of juridical judgments: An
increase in the defined punishment, for example, from prison sentence to capital punish-
ment, can lead to a reduction in the number of convictions.
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